Vietnam & After

"A Critique of the Oppositional Media Thesis"

   Daniel C. Hallin examines "objective Journalism" during the the war in Vietnam. Hallin believes that some journalists cover "easy" topics so they can report in an objective way.  The easiest way to do this is by asking "technical" questions that will not suggest the reporter is giving an opinion.  According to Hallin:

                        "It is much easier to discuss with an attitude of 'disinterested realism' the accuracy of the HES than, for example, the question of whether American intervention in Vietnam was ultimately good or bad for the Vietnamese peasant". 

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was a computerized process used to "produced the official figures on the progress of pacification" (Hallin, 553-554).   Hallin references a report by CBS news in 1968 regarding the pacification program.  The correspondent for this report was Murray Fromson's.  Fromson wraps up the first and second part of his report:

"Fromson (concluding Part I.) So pacification does not stand still.  It moves forward, it moves back.  But what is the balance?  What is the trend. . . .?  An effort is being made to measure this and we'll look at the measurements in our next report."

"Fromson (concluding part II).  Another offensive by the Communists would undermine the program. . . .But the momentum seams to be in the other direction.  Since the November 1 bombing halt governement and U.S. troops have taken over nearly 800 hamlets. . . .  The goal is to occupy another 300 of these hamlets by the anniversary of the Tet offensive." (Hallin, 533)

The "concluding" parts do not seem to conclude anything. According to  Hallin the report focused on the "effectiveness of existing policy" and did not reexamine the "roots of the war".  It is easier to report information that is gathered by American sources as opposed to speaking to the Vietnamese.  Not only is that difficult, but the reporter would have to explain the political conflict in Vietnam that is largely different from the politics in America. The more important issues in the war were not being covered properly in part because of this "easy reporting", especially in television.  Lastly, I will quote Hallin's thoughts on television:

                        "More broadly, the narrow immediacy of television meant that noe of the larger questions posed by the war was raised in any substantial way in the news.  There was no discussion of the origins of revolution ("Guerrilla war, like hives, can break out any time, any place," one correspondent explained).  There was no second look at the doctrine of containment or it's application to a conflict like Vietnam: should such a conflict be treated as one "front" in a global struggle? there was not discussion of why this war eventually seemed to contradict so drastically the image of war and the image of themselves Americans held when they went into it: Why the violence that came to be symbolized by My Lai?  Why the collapse of morale?  Why the hostility of so many of those we thought we were saving, even the ones fighting with us?" (Hallin, 556)

Philip Jones Griffiths: Vietnam Inc.

The New York Times reports that Philip Jones Griffiths is dead.

This 1968 photo of American soldiers giving water to a wounded Vietcong solder who had survived for several days with his intestines hanging out of his belly was published with his obituary in the Times. 

He was one of the great photo-journalists covering the war in Vietnam; his book of photographs, Vietnam Inc. (1971), is one of the most powerful documents of the tragedy of war. 

The Musarium has a great on-line version of Vietnam Inc.  which also features a 2002 video interview with Philip Jones Griffiths conducted by Bob Danin for the Musarium.

Here is a brief excerpt from the Times obituary which discusses Vietnam Inc. and the photo posted above:

"While critical of the way the United States was conducting the war, Mr. Griffiths also included in his book many humanizing images of American soldiers at a time when they were often being demonized back home. One of the most stark showed an American offering a canteen of water to a Vietcong fighter who had survived a stomach wound for three days, holding in his intestines with a cooking bowl. A similar scenario is played out in Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 film “Apocalypse Now.”

“There were some bad G.I.’s who did terrible, terrible things,” Mr. Griffiths said in a lecture at the Frontline Club in London in January. “But for the most part they were kids who were confused. They were not the enemy, to me.” The enemy was usually governments and bureaucracies, he often said, and he saw photography as one of the best means to bear witness against their failings.

“Virtually the whole of society believes in what they believe not by direct experience but by what they’ve been told,” he said. “We photographers are in this exalted, privileged position of actually going out to find out for ourselves, and that’s why we’re so dangerous. Because we were there. We saw what happened.” "

The media and the war

Spiro Agnew talks about the media and the war. He talks about how many Americans are watching the war and how many people are keeping up with the war through the media. He also talks the usage of the media to keep America informed. He talks about how media coverage of the war is not only to inform, but to also make money through the viewers. He states "One Federal Communications Commissioner considers the powers of the networks equal to that of local, state and Federal Governments all combined. Certainly it represents a concentration of power over American public opinion unknown to history." He also states how there are powers between the news media and politics, the usage of the media can either help or take down candidates without the influence of the public.

U.S. Policy in Vietnam--Deception and Denial?

It seems as though there is a striking similarity between many events that the U.S. Government was involved in during the time period from the mid 1940's through the early 1960's in Vietnam--a connection of deception and denial.  Beginning with the inability of the U.S. (or ignorance, depending on who you talk to) to comprehend the resistant and independent nature of the Vietnamese people, through the failed attempt at nation building in Vietnam with the Diem regime, the United States has both deceived (the Vietnamese, Americans at home and the world population) and been unable, or unwilling to realize its mistakes and shortcomings.

More specifically, the entire Diem regime and its failed programs, such as land reform and the so called "Strategic Hamlets," were represented to the world as successes all the way until the bitter end, when they inevitably collapsed.  Indeed, these programs represent the U. S. Government and Military's misguided strategy on a smaller scale, while the attempt at nation building with Diem represents the U.S. government's failure to recognize its defeat in the "big picture."

Marilyn Young talks about the U.S. Governments misrepresentations and propaganda in regard to North Vietnam's land reform policy:

"Instead of alienating the population, as contemporary American analysts had expected, land reform...and the public rectification of its campaign excesses deepened popular support for the government.  As even defectors to South Vietnam tried to instruct the unbelieving Americans who questioned them, "the North has the support of the people." 

James Gibson demonstrates this misrepresentation of truth through the Strategic Hamlets in Chapter 4, America Comes to Vietnam:

"Strategic Hamlets represented an attempt by a weak government to control physically people it did not understand because of antagonistic class and religious differences...Yet the program was represented as a success in Saigon and Washington...Officials had strong motivations to falsify the number of villages they controlled."

On the larger scale, the entire foundation on which these programs were built--the Diem government--was itself an illusion.  The government was doomed from the start, due to a number of variables, including Ho Chi Minh's immense popularity, Diem's inability to connect with the peasants, his unwillingness to compromise and his paranoia of being attacked, which led to major growth of the NLF movement. 

Marilyn Young writes of media's questioning of the Diem regime in Chapter Five, The Fall of Diem:

"The more insistent was official American optimism about the course of the war, the more energetically the press called that optimism into question.  Reporters...described in detail the fragility and corruption of the Diem regime and the failure of its military to profit from nine years of American training and mountains of equipment."

Naturally, the Diem regime eventually imploded, with a Coup d'état by Diem's military, who captured and killed both Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.  When the Diem regime was removed, the string of deceit and refutation by the United States would not end in Vietnam.  Perhaps more deception, rather than denial, would play out in the 1960's, with incidents like the the Gulf of Tonkin, but the same dubious American policy in Vietnam remained.    

Rumored Warfare

Colonel Edward Geary Lansdale was an officer in the United States Air force and an active member of the Office of Strategic Services.  In 1953 Lansdale was sent to Vietnam as an adviser to the French, in order to help with the Vietminh struggle. 

"His original mission, to bypass the French and work with sympathetic Vietnamese in unconventional warfare, was now readily redirected to "paramilitary operations in Communist Areas."

It was Lansdale's mission to utilize the Vietnamese as an armed force for the coming war.  Although he was supposed to have worked hand in hand with the French to attain the Vietnamese, Lansdale worked in his own way.  He used any means necessary to manipulate the Vietnamese into allying with the French.  He pushed for the Vietnamese to go against Chinese Communist troops, by giving them misinformation. 

"In Hanoi, his team distributed leaflets that spread disinformation about new economic and monetary regulations, causing some panic among more affluent residents; they poured sugar into the gas tanks of Hanoi buses, impeding public transportation and creating consumer dissatisfaction; they suborned astrologers who predicted dire disasters; they spread rumors of rampaging, raping Chinese Communist troops."

By Lansdale feeding the Vietnamese with misinformation he was able to create an Alli for the French.  He took the Vietnamese people's lack of information and used it to his advantage.  In having his troops hand out leaflets that lead them to believe all of these terrible things were being done by the Communist troops, he inadvertently pushed the Vietnamese into siding with socialism.  Although this tactic may seem unfair, because it played on the lack of information the Vietnamese people had, it still proved to work.  Lansdale took the large population of Vietnamese he had access to, and was able to use them as militia during the war.  Although these people were not military trained, they were fighting for what was theirs.  Which in some cases can prove to be more of a reason to fight harder. 

Colonel Edward Geary Lansdale

   

The war that was like a movie

Vietnam war

The war was a first of its kind, it was made public through the media. It was believed that if the people back in the U.S. saw what was going on they might agree with the war. Many people protested the war and the reasons for going to war, but the media was a good way to keep the Americans informed.

"The Vietnam war has been featured heavily in television and films. The war also influenced a generation of musicians and song writers. The musical Miss Saigon focuses on the end of the war and its aftermath."

Director Oliver Stone Returns to Vietnam & My Lai

Oliver Stone has already made three movies on the Vietnam war starting in 1986 with "Platoon."   According to Time he is back in Vietnam getting ready to film "Pinkville," a movie about the My Lai massacre. 

According to Variety, Bruce Willis will be starring as General William Peers who led the Army investigation of the incident which resulted in the Peers report.

Time reporter Kay Johnson interviewed Stone in Danang.  She asked him why he was making this movie now.  Here is his response:

"Why now? Because of Iraq. That's a major reason. I had no intention of making a fourth Vietnam movie at all. But this last year — you know my feelings about the Iraq war of course — I think the time has unfortunately come back around to remember events like My Lai.

Why My Lai? Because it's a great story. I was [serving] in Vietnam at the time, and it really made an impression, and I think it changed the course of the war to a large degree. Americans were shocked, as well as the Vietnamese. You have to take into account that many Vietnamese villagers were neutral. It turned many neutral villagers against us. It was an interesting turning point."

Johnson also asked Stone if being a Vietnam veteran made it easier to understand what led to the My Lai incident.  Stone's answer astutely shifts the question from the responsibility of the individual soldiers involved to the bigger question of the war policy that created the situation:

"Not easy, but I can understand it. I mean, you saw a bit of it in Platoon. Not on this scale. But that's part of what the movie shows, visualizes, dramatizes — the peer pressure, the tension. [My Lai] happened. It's a fact. It's history. I'm not seeking to denigrate the average soldier. There was a breakdown in that division and there was a breakdown from the top. And I think it had a lot to do with the war policy, which was basically body counts, kill ratios, search and destroy, free-fire zones — these concepts, when they are allowed to grow, grow out of hand. And they got out of hand in many cases. My Lai is one of them."

Kay Johnson got Stone's reaction to President  Bush's Kansas City speech in which he compared the results of pulling out of Vietnam to what would happen if we left Iraq.  Stone has little patience with Bush:

"Now that's despicable. The man went to Yale, but he never went to class. Obviously he didn't learn history. Anyone who knows anything about Vietnam would know that it was not the American withdrawal that precipitated chaos in this area. It was quite the opposite. It was the American invasion that precipitated the chaos. I don't think he was a good student. I was in the same class with him at Yale — '68. I left, he stayed. But he didn't learn his lessons."

Did the American withdrawal precipitate chaos as the Bush administration claims?  Or was it "the American invasion that precipitated the chaos"?   What are the facts?

john Kerry

"We who have come here to Washington have come here because we feel we have to be winter soldiers now. We could come back to this country; we could be quiet; we could hold our silence; we could not tell what went on in Vietnam, but we feel because of what threatens this country, the fact that the crimes threaten it, not reds, and not redcoats but the crimes which we are committing that threaten it, that we have to speak out." This quote comes from John Kerry. It was his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971. Mr.Kerry speaks about previous wars in which the soldiers were ruthless in their killings and also did many horrible things for fun, such as blowing up dogs and cutting off genitals. He talks about a "winter soldier" which is a soldier  term based on words of Thomas Paine in 1776 when he spoke of the Sunshine Patriot and summertime soldiers who deserted at Valley Forge because the going was rough.

John Kerry and others feel there is nothing in vietnam for us and to attempt to justify one American life lost is hypocrisy.They found that was not only a civil war but the south vietnamese were willing to stand up for themselves.

American Psyche

Very interesting article comparing the psyche of the Americans in Iraq to the psyche of the Americans in Vietnam. In it President Bush talks about not losing the reason we are in Iraq-to help others. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14487361/site/newsweek/#

"If we ever give up the desire to help people who want to live in a free society, we will have lost our soul as a nation."

This statement reminds me of the LB Johnson explains why Americans fight, 1965 reading packet we reviewed in class. LBJ's quote"

"We are there to strengthen world order. Around the globe from Berlin to Thailand are people whose well being rests in part on the belief they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war."

The Iraq war is a war on Terror, Vietnam was a war on Communism. Both countries ideals differer from America values and morals. Are we there because the Iraqi's need to be Americanized? We tried to modernize (Americanize) Vietnam. We took peasant farmers out of their country villages and placed them in cities we built with running water, electricity, sewage systems and jobs. They didn't find the American dream; what the Vietnamese ended up with were a corrupt government, black markets, high inflation, prostitution, drugs and even more poverty. Will the new free society we are fighting for in Iraq be better? We don't know, we will just have to wait it out and see.

Vietnam: Domestic Entanglements

On page 94 in Young's book, The Vietnam Wars, there is a quote by John Kennedy about his concerns over pulling out of Vietnam that captures the predicament that LBJ found himself in, "I'll be damned everywhere as a Communist appeaser. But I don't care. If I tried to pull out completely now from Vietnam we would have another Joe McCarthy red scare on our hands, but I can do it after I am reelected."
This window into the mindset of the former president reveals the common emphasis on political aspirations over ethical and sound foreign policy decisions. Kennedy, like LBJ after him, felt extreme political domestic heat during the cold war. In the years just after McCarthyism it is quite easy to see how members of the U.S. government felt at any moment that their hold on power and poltics could be threatened with a smear campaign. LBJ's swaggering, tough-talking Texas charisma could not take a hit for being seen as soft. Poltically it was viewed as a mistake, but persoanlly his ego might have gotten the better of him and he might felt Vietnam was a test of his manhood and he wasn't going to back down. He had an image to protect and preserve.
The electorate in our country enjoy leaders with personality and emotive, communicative skills, however at the same time, we value level headed stoicism and calm in our leaders when it comes to tough or threatening times. It is rare that we can find both, Lincoln during the Civil War was a good example of a steady image that the North could have faith in. Our current president enjoyed a similar place in the American perspective weeks after 9/11 but his stoicism has revealed many cracks and his decisions have taken a great deal of criticism since the toppling of Sadam Hussein. The years after the military escalation in Vietnam reveal a defeated, confused, and almost desperate president. What if LBJ refused to cater to what he believed the public wanted? What if he spoke candidly to the American people and let them know that Vietnam was not a priority but his 'Great Society' was? How different would our history be if our involvement in Vietnam ended in 1964 or 65 instead of intensifying?
Behind every foreign policy decision there exists a domestic president with domestic objectives. A democratic society ensures that domestic ramifications over foreign policy issues will be a political reality, for better or worse.